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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 6, 1997, a Forsyth County, North Carolina jury returned a verdict of
guilty of first degree murder and two life sentences without parole against Thomas
Richard Jones for the defendant's role in a fatal car accident in September of 1996.'
Although the first degree murder conviction and the two life sentences are the most
severe ever handed down in North Carolina against a drunk driver causing a fatality,2
it was less severe than the death penalty sentence that was sought by the Forsyth
County Prosecutor The jury in this instance chose not to impose the sentence of
death on the defendant. However, with Forsyth County prosecutor, Vince Rabil,
vowing to utilize the felony-murder rule in the future for similar cases,4 the question
arises of whether first-degree murder convictions for death by automobile are
1
See Rich McKay, JurorsGive Driver Two Life Sentences, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, May 7,
1997, atAl.
2

See id.

3
In addition to being the toughest sentence handed down in North Carolina for a DUI causing fatality,
the death penalty sought by the prosecutor is the most severe penalty attempted in the nation. See McKay, supra
note 1, at Al.
See id.
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properly within the purview of the felony-murder doctrine.
In discussing the relevant issues brought forward by this case, Part Two of
this article will begin by offering a description of the facts leading up to and
including the fatal crash. Part Three will give a history of the felony murder rule,
exploring its purpose as well as its modem trends and limitations and will examine
whether use of the felony murder rule in this instance runs against the modem tide of
its acceptance. Part Four will detail the State's theory and application of the felonymurder rule in this case. It will include a discussion of the relevant arguments for and
against the State's theory. Part Five will discuss the traditional use of the felonymurder rule in cases of death by a vehicle and will survey felony-murder statutes
nationwide to determine the potential for the felony-murder rule's use in similar
situations. The article will conclude with Part Six summarizing the relevant issues
produced by this case and offer an editorial of the utilization of the felony-murder
rule for vehicular homicide.
II. STATEMENT OF THE SCENARIO

5

On September 4, 1996, sometime around 10:30 P.M., the defendant was
operating a 1996 Nissan Altima in Forsyth County, North Carolina.' Moments prior
to the crash witnesses observed the Defendant's car traveling at a rate of speed
somewhere between 45 and 65 M.P.H. in a 35 M.P.H. zone.7 The Defendant's car
was swerving from side to side and at one point ran up over a curb causing a hubcap
from the car to fall off.' The Defendant's car ran into the rear of another auto just one
to two minutes before the crash.' The Defendant proceeded down the road and at
some point crossed the center line causing the victim's 1995 Mazda MX-3 to cross
into the Defendant's lane of travel in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the collision.'"
The Mazda was occupied by six passengers, two in the front seat and four in the rear
seat." The impact on the passenger side of the Mazda resulted in the death of two of
The facts of the case offered are derived from both the Forsyth County Prosecutor's Brief, as well as
the Defendant's Brief. Although the facts as offered by the State were accepted "arguendo" by the Defendant,
any discrepancies between the two versions will be noted. See State's Brief on Felony Murder, State of North
Carolina v. Thomas Richard Jones, Forsyth County Superior Court, (96 CRS 34278); see also DEFENDANT'S
BRIEF TO PRECLUDE TRIAL ON FELONY MURDER THEORY, State v. Jones, 96 CRS 34278, 34279, 36858, 36862,
36861, In the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division [hereinafter DEFENDANT'S BRIEF]. Sources are
on file with the author.
s

See State's Brief, supra note 5,at 1-2, Jones (96 CRS 34278).
7

See id.at3.

8

See id.

9
The State characterized this incident as "a repeated ramming" while the Defendant believed this to
be an exaggerated description of the event. Id.
10

See id.
at 1-2.

11

See State's Brief, supra note 5, at 2, Jones (96 CRS 34278).
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the passengers. 2 Three other passengers suffered multiple bone fractures as well as
various internal injuries requiring surgery.1" While the defendant was being treated
for his injuries at the hospital, police noticed a "moderate" odor of alcohol coming
from the defendant. 4 Two blood samples were taken several hours apart.' The first
indicated a blood alcohol content of .05 while the second test was unable to detect
the presence of alcohol. 8 The tests did reveal that to a "reasonable scientific
certainty," the defendant was under the influence, at the time of the crash, of xanax
and two other impairing narcotic substances." At the time of the accident the
defendant had charges pending for Driving While Impaired in Iredell County, North
Carolina."8 The Forsyth County prosecutor proceeded to charge the defendant with
Murder in the First Degree utilizing the North Carolina felony-murder statute." The
precise theory of the State will be discussed in Part Four. Prior to this, however, I
believe it is relevant to study the history of the felony-murder rule.
III. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FELONY MURDER RULE

The common law definition of the felony murder doctrine is, "the author of
an unintended homicide is guilty of murder if the killing takes place in the
perpetration of a felony."2 ° The doctrine of felony murder is attributed to English
Law and Lord Coke in his 1644 statement, "that a death caused by an unlawful act is
murder."'" Coke went on to offer this illustration:
If a man shoots at a wild fowl and accidentally kills a man, that is
an excusable homicide because the act of shooting is not unlawful;
but if a man shoots at a cock or a hen belonging to another man and

12

See id.

13

See id.

14

Id.

15

See id. at 2-3.

16

See State's Brief, supra note 5, at 2-3, Jones (96 CRS 34278).

The State proffered that its expert testimony would be that the defendant was to reasonable scientific
certainty, appreciably impaired and unfit to operate a motor vehicle at the time ofthe crash. See id. at 3.
17

18

See id. at 4.

19

See id.

20

2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 147, at 295 (15th ed. 1994).

21

Id. at 295-96.
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accidentally kills a man, that is murder because the act is unlawful.'
This doctrine was later amended to cover only those unlawful acts which
were felonies.23 It is very important to note, however, that at the time of the felony
murder rule's inception, all felonies were punished by death." Therefore, whether the
accused was being sentenced to death for the actual killing or for the underlying
felony was of little consequence."
Some have criticized Lord Coke's statement as completely lacking in
authority and as a mistake made by Coke in his translation of earlier common law
decisions. Critics argue that the common law holdings on which Coke relied
pronounced that such accidental killings done in the perpetration of an unlawful act
would be unlawful but not murder. This early common law definition of the felonymurder rule went mostly unchallenged however because, as noted above, the
punishment for an unlawful killing and a felony were both death.28 England began to
retreat from the felony-murder rule in the Nineteenth century by offering the
limitation that only those felonious acts done that are reasonably known to be
dangerous and likely to cause death were to be utilized for the underlying felony.'
This retreat culminated in the 1957 Act which abolished the felony-murder rule in
England.
The theory of felony-murder is that while there is no malice "in fact" in the
actual killing, the malice is supplied by the act of committing the felony. The
malice in committing the felony is then transferred to the homicide." A homicide
22

Id.

23

See id.

24

See id. at 305.

25

See 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 147, at 305.

26

See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 308-09 (Mich. 1980). The Michigan Supreme Court offering

a detailed analysis of the history of the felony-murder rule, criticizing its authority and logic, the court
announced, "the felony-murder doctrine is unnecessary and in many cases unjust in that it violates the basic
premise of individual moral culpability upon which our criminal law is based." Id. at 309.
27

See id. at 310.

28

See id.

29

See id. at 312 (quoting Regina v. Seme, 16 Cox Crim.Cas. 311 (1887)).

See id.(citing Section 1 of England's Homicide Act, 1957) ( providing that a killing occurring in a
felony-murder situation will not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought as is required
for all other murder).
30

31

2 WHARTON'S § 147, at 296-97.

32

See id
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committed with malice is by common law definition "murder."'* Modem felonymurder statutes of individual states seem to be pattemed after the 1794 felonymurder statute of Pennsylvania, which was the first state to subdivide murder into
degrees:' "All murder.., which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary shall be deemed murder in the
first degree." 3"
Although the enumerated felonies offered by the various states are not
exactly the same, most of the enumerated felonies seem to share the element of
danger or violence.' Some of the often offered felonies are: arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, and kidnaping. 37
A.

The Purpose ofthe Felony-MurderRule

The precise purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is greatly debated. Is
the doctrine based on deterrence of dangerous felonies or is it more narrowly based
on deterring those who commit felonies from perpetrating them in a dangerous
way? If the purpose is to merely deter dangerous felonies then why not simply
make the punishments for those felonies severe enough to deter the felony itself?
Some argue therefore that the real purpose of the felony-murder rule is the latter of
the two possible approaches. 9 For example, the felony-murder doctrine may
encourage a robber to use an unloaded gun, or for an arsonist to make sure that the
building he is about to set ablaze is unoccupied."' This approach seems to coincide
with the statutory schemes that list only those felonies which are likely to produce a
great risk of violence or death.
B.

Modern Limitationsand Trends

The first of the limitations on the application of the felony-murder doctrine
is that the underlying felony must be one that is inherently dangerous to human
33

See id.

3

See id. at 299.

35

Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. at 66 (Tent Draft No. 9, 1959)).

36

See 2 WHARTON'S § 147, at 300.

37

See id.

38

See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 309.

39

See id.

40

See Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L.

REv. 701, 709-17 (1937).
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life."' An example of this limitation is as follows: if the selling of liquor constitutes
a felony and that by selling this liquor one dies by becoming drunk and dying of
exposure and alcoholism, this selling of liquor cannot be used as the predicate
felony as it is "an act not itself directly and naturally dangerous to life." 42
The second limitation is that there must be some proximate or legal cause
connection between the felonious act and the death. 43 This limitation is argued in
terms of whether the death came about by some unforeseeable intervening cause."
An example is offered in the case of an arsonist who sets a building on fire which
results in a fireman's death while fighting the fire. At least one court held that the
death of the fireman, in this situation, was reasonably foreseeable and therefore the
arson was linked as the cause of the death."
A third limitation, also related to causal connection, is that the death must
occur "in the commission or the attempted commission of the felony."' "4To make a
determination of this vague statement courts look to the connection of time and
distance between the felony and the death. 7
Another modem limitation is not to hold the defendant criminally
responsible for a death caused by someone other than himself or his co-felon."'
However, not all jurisdictions have adopted this limitation. Some find an
application of the felony-murder doctrine proper where, for example, a police
officer causes the death of a co-felon or where a police officer kills a bystander by
accident."
Sentences involving capital punishment offers another limitation to the
doctrine of felony-murder. A defendant who did not actually commit the killing,
may not be sentenced to death absent a showing of major participation in the felony
and a reckless indifference to human life. 50
The felony-murder doctrine has come under considerable attack since its
41

See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 547 (1972).

42

People v. Pavlie, 199 N.W. 373, 374 (Mich. 1924).

43

See LAFAVE, supra note 41, at 548.

44

See id. at 547.

45

See State v. Glover, 50 S.W.2d 1049, 1056 (Mo. 1932).

46

LAFAVE, supranote 41, at 555.

47

See id.

48

See 2 WHARTON'S

49

See id. at 317-18.

so

See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137-38 (1987).

§

147, at 316-17.
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inception." As discussed above, it is argued that the doctrine is not solidly based on
any historical authority and was not the result of rational judicial decision making.
52
It seems to run against the modem trend of categorizing homicide by culpability.
Even its birthplace has rejected its usefulness in this century. So why does this
illogical and archaic tool exist so prominently in American jurisprudence today?
The answer may be crystal clear when studying its application in the State of North
Carolinav. Thomas RichardJones.' Its durability seems to be a result of both the
public outcry for tougher penalties and the prosecutor's willingness to use the rule
as an efficient way to give the public what they want.' Unfortunately, this is done
at the expense of the criminal's rights.
IV. STATE'S THEORY OF FELONY-MURDER

The defendant in State v. Jones"s was prosecuted pursuant to North
Carolina's felony murder statute which provides that "[a] murder... which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a
sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted
with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first
J
degree[.]"
At first blush the actions of the defendant in Jones do not seem to fall
neatly into any of the enumerated felonies offered by the statute." However, the
state proceeded under the theory that the defendant's actions in this case should be
construed as "any other felony.., committed with the use of a deadly weapon[.]" 5"
The "any other felony" element of the felony-murder statute was pursued under
the alternative theories that the predicate felony was either assault with a deadly
51

See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Story of the Forces that
Shape Our CriminalLaw, 51 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1429 (1994).
52

See id. at 1460-63 (discussing the role of law and politics as the main factor for the rule's

endurance).
53

Forsyth County Superior Court (96 CRS 34278).

S

See Tomkovicz, supranote 51, at 1460-63.

55

Forsyth County Superior Court (96 CRS 34278).

5

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1994).

A drunk driver who accidentally kills with his automobile does not seem to satisfy any of the
enumerated felonies, until the State suggests that this accident can be classified as an assault with a deadly
weapon.
57

STATE'S BRIEF ON FELONY MURDER FOR WATSON HEARING (AMENDED 12-12-96), State v. Jones,
96 CRS 34278, 34279, 36858, 36862, 36861, In the General Court of Justice Superior Court Division § 21
[hereinafter STATE'S BRIEF].
58
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weapon or second degree murder committed with a deadly weapon." The State
then contended that an automobile constitutes a "deadly weapon," thereby
arguably satisfying the necessary elements of the felony-murder statute.'
Furthermore, the State argued that several aggravating factors under North
Carolina's Capital Punishment Act61 were present thereby making the defendant
eligible for the sentence of death.62 Under this theory, the State would be relieved of
proving any premeditation or deliberation in obtaining a conviction of first degree
murder.6 3 In fact, the State could even win a death sentence without ever
demonstrating that the defendant intended to inflict injury on any of the victims."
This is a demonstration of how the felony-murder rule works.
A.

Assault With a Deadly Weapon Inflicting Serious Injury

Under the North Carolina assault statute, "[a]ny person who assaults
another person with a deadly weapon and inflicts serious injury shall be punished
as a class E felon." 65 The State contended that when the defendant's automobile
crashed into the victims' automobile causing serious injury to three of the
passengers, this amounted to assault with a deadly weapon causing serious injury.'
The felony-murder rule works under the assumption that it is not necessary
to demonstrate an intent to commit murder, because the intent is inferred or
transferred from the intent to commit the enumerated and dangerous predicate
felony." In North Carolina, however, there is no requirement to prove an intent to
harm to obtain a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon causing serious
injury.66 In fact, the State need only show that the assault arose from "culpable
negligence" on the part of the actor." In State v. Lancaster," the court offered this
59

Id.

60

See id. at 17-22.

61

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1995).

62

See STATE'S BRIEF, supra note 58, at 8-11.

63

See id. at 5 (citing State v. Branch, 415 P.2d 766 (Or. 1966)).

64

See discussion infra.

65

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(b) (1994).

6

See STATE'S BRIEF, supranote 58, at 5-6.

67

See discussioninfra

66

See State v. Lancaster, 180 S.E. 577, 578 (N.C. 1935).

69

See id.
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definition of culpable negligence:
Culpable Negligence is such recklessness or carelessness,
proximately resulting in injury or death, as imports a thoughtless
disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety
and rights of others. An intentional, willful, or wanton violation of
a statute or ordinance designed for the protection of human life or
limb, which proximately results in injury or death is culpable
negligence.71
The State offered as proof of the culpable negligence element that the
defendant drove his automobile in violation of North Carolina General Statute
section 20-138.1 (Driving While Impaired),72 or in the alternative, in violation of
North Carolina General Statute section 20-140 (Reckless Driving),73 both of which
have been held to be statutes designed for "the protection of human life and
limb."' In addition, the State presented North Carolina case law that held that a
violation of the Driving While Impaired statute is "as a matter of law culpable
negligence." 7 s
As discussed above, the crime of assault with a deadly weapon is a general
intent crime and does not require a showing of specific intent.7' The North Carolina
Court of Appeals has held that the driver of an automobile "may be convicted of an
assault with a deadly weapon when ...

he strikes or injures a person, provided

there is either (1) an actual intent to inflict injury, or (2) culpable or criminal
negligence from which an intent may be implied."'
In effect, the State is not just borrowing the intent needed from the
enumerated felony of assault with a deadly weapon. It is first taking the intent to
violate one of the motor vehicle statutes and transferring that intent to assault with
70

180 S.E. 577 (N.C. 1935).

71

Id. at 578.

72

N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-138.1 (1994).

73

N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-140 (1994).

74

State v. Weston, 159 S.E.2d 883, 886 (N.C. 1968) (holding the reckless driving statute to be a

safety statute for the protection of human life or limb); see also State v. McGill, 336 S.E.2d 90 (N.C. 1985)
(holding that the Driving While Impaired statute was designed for the protection of human life and limb).
75

STATE'S BRIEF, supra note 58, at 6.

76

See Lancaster, 180 S.E. at 578.

See State v. Eason, 86 S.E.2d 774, 778 (N.C. 1955) (citing State v. Sudderth, 114 S.E. 828 (N.C.
1922); State v. Agnew, 164 S.E. 578 (N.C. 1932); 5 Am. Jur. 914, Automobiles, §763).

77
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a deadly weapon and then further transferring that intent to satisfy the first degree
murder in accordance with the felony-murder rule.
B.

Automobile as a Deadly Weapon

The general rule in North Carolina regarding deadly weapons is that "[a]
deadly weapon is not one which must kill, but one which under the circumstances
of its use is likely to cause death or great bodily harm." 78 The State relied on the
holding of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. McBride' that an
automobile may be considered "a weapon or device which in its normal use is
hazardous to the lives of more than one person." 80 Therefore, the State argued that
the defendant's operation of his car while impaired and driving into the path of an
oncoming vehicle "constitutes the use of a car in such a way that is likely to cause
death or great bodily harm" therefore satisfying the standard set forth in
Strickland.8
C.

Aggravating Circumstances

North Carolina General Statute section 15A-2000 allows for the death
sentence in those first degree murders where one or more statutory aggravating
circumstances are found to be present and when they outweigh any mitigating
circumstances also found to be present. 2 The relevant aggravating circumstances in
the state's theory are (1) "knowing creation of a great risk of death to more than
one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to
the lives of more than one person;"8 3 and (2) "murder committed during a violent
course of conduct towards others is present."84
The State contended that the analogous case of McBride, holding that an
automobile can be found in its use to be a weapon which is dangerous to the lives
of more than one person, allowed the State to submit to the jury the question of an
78

State v. Strickland, 225 S.E.2d 531, 538 (N.C. 1976) (citing State v. Smith, 121 S.E. 737 (1924)).

79

425 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), appealafter remand,454 S.E.2d 840 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).

o

Id. (the court's holding was in context of deciding whether the automobile a dangerous device in

its normal use threatening the lives of more than one person, thereby constituting an aggravating factor under
N.C.G.S. 15A-1340.16(d)(8)). See also State v. Coffey, 259 S.E.2d 356 (N.C. 1979); Eason, 86 S.E.2d at
774.
81

STATE'S BRIEF, supra note 58, at 12.

82

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1994).

83

N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-2000(e)(10) (1994).

84

N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-2000(e)(l 1) (1994).
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aggravating factor under section 2000(e)(10).' In addition, the State argued that the
course of conduct of the defendant "ramming" into another vehicle moments prior
to the crash should be considered by the jury as to whether this constituted a violent
course of conduct."
D.

Defense Arguments againstState's Theory of Felony-Murder

The strongest argument that the defendant raised is that for an enumerated
felony to qualify under the felony-murder statute, it must be a specific intent felony
and not merely a general intent felony." "Simply put, a culpable negligence based
felony cannot supply the malice necessary for felony-murder." 8 As discussed
previously in the background section of this article, the malice for a felony-murder
conviction is supplied by an intentional and violent felony."'
The defendant cited the jury instructions upheld by the North Carolina
Appellate Court in State v. Gunn," instructing that the jury, as to the finding of
intent for the underlying felony of assault with a deadly weapon, "must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted 'intentionally' and that this
intent was a specific intent."'"
In addition, the defendant argued that the state of North Carolina had never
allowed a conviction in an analogous situation to rise beyond second degree
murder." And furthermore, when the court allowed a second degree murder
conviction, the malice was provided by facts far more egregious than were present
in Jones.3
The defendant finally asserted that prosecution under this theory of felonymurder was not within the purview of what the legislature intended when crafting
the felony-murder statute.' The legislature had crafted a statute specifically dealing
as

See McBride, 425 S.E.2d at 733-34.

a

See STATE'S BRIEF, supranote 58, at 8-11.

87

See DEFENDANT'S BRIEF, supra note 5, at 7.

a8

Id.

89

See supra text accompanying notes 19-52.

so

211 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975).

91

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF, supra note 5, at 6 (citing Gunn, 211 S.E.2d at 508).

92

See id. at 7 (citing State v. Snyder, 317 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)).

See id. (citing Snyder, 317 S.E.2d at 394 (facts included a Breathalyzer result of-24 to .32, passing
in a no-passing zone, knocking a vehicle off the road and then reaching speeds of 70 M.P.H. while running a
red light)).
93

94

See DEFENDANT'S BRIEF, supranote 5, at 7.
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with driving while impaired causing death, North Carolina General Statute 20141.4(a)(1), "a person commits the offense of felony death by vehicle if he
unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the offense of
impaired driving[.]""9 The annotations explain that the legislative intent of this
statute was to create a lesser included offense where the crime is not dependant on
criminal culpability.' Since this statute included the element of driving impaired it
implied that the State was required to show something more than merely driving
impaired to establish criminal culpability." The defendant argued that had the State
legislature wished to include the enumerated felony of driving impaired causing
death, it would have done so after reviewing the criminal statutes; its absence was
telling of their intent. 8
The defendant offered an illustration of the absurdity of prosecuting under
such a theory:
[A]n unimpaired defendant, passing in a no-passing zone strikes a
multiple occupant vehicle, causing a wrist fracture of occupant A
and the death of occupant B - under the State's theory of [assault
with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury] by culpable
negligence, the driver could be prosecuted capitally for B's
death[.] 9
In conclusion, the State provided strong case law to back up each of its
individual propositions in building its felony-murder case." However, it was
lacking precedent providing specifically that such a case can be tried under the
felony-murder statute."' Admittedly, the fact that no analogous case exists is not
fatal to the State, however, it should send strong cautionary signals to the appellate
courts that such a theory should be examined with the utmost scrutiny. 2 This case
demonstrates the unbridled power the State will enjoy if allowed to utilize the

95

N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-141.4 (1994).

96

See id.

By including the word "unintentionally,"
intentionally caused the death of another.
97

the statute implied the State must show the driver

98

See DEFENDANT'S BRIEF, supranote 5, at 7.

99

Id. at 5.

100

See id.

101

See id.

102

Arguably any theory that has never been sanctioned by an appellate court, will likely be received

for review above.
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felony-murder rule for vehicular homicides, where no intent to injure another is
present.
V. SURVEY OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE AS MURDER

A.

VehicularHomicide as SecondDegree Murder

Courts have traditionally upheld prosecutions for vehicular homicide
where a second degree murder conviction was sought."l 3 In particular, convictions
under the felony-murder theory have been allowed to supply the necessary malice
for a conviction of second degree murder.'" This application of the felony-murder
rule, however, has generally been limited to murder in the second degree."' 5 In State
v. Beal," for example, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the case was properly
submitted under the felony-murder doctrine where the defendant killed another
motorist while attempting to flee from officers following a robbery.0 7 The Supreme
Court of Virginia also sustained a conviction under felony-murder doctrine where
the underlying felony was fleeing from an officer to avoid being apprehended for
habitually driving while intoxicated.1 8 These cases however were presented under
second degree felony-murder rules. For example, the second degree felony-murder
rule in Virginia defines felony homicide as the "killing of one accidentally,
contrary to the intention of the parties, while in the prosecution of some felonious
act other than those specified in (the first degree statute)."1 9 The Virginia
legislature seems to have drawn a distinction for murder committed in the
perpetration of felonies that were not enumerated in the first degree felony-murder
section.
Other prosecutions for second degree murder involving a vehicular
homicide have been upheld without the use of the felony-murder doctrine."0 For
example, in those cases in which the facts support a finding of extreme indifference
to human life, the common law elements of second degree murder are met by
103

See H.C. Lind, Annotation, Homicide By Automobile As Murder, 21 A.L.R. 3d 116, 122 (1969).

104

See id.

l05

See discussion infra.

106

470 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1971).

107

See id.at 512.

108

See generally Davis v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 1991).

109

VA. CODEANN. §18.2-33 (Michie 1975).

110

See Lind, supranote 103, at 136.
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demonstrating malice.' In Commonwealth v. Cherubin,1 2 the defendant actually
pointed his vehicle at the victim and ran her down, thereby supporting an inference
of malice necessary for a conviction of second degree murder. " 3
B.

First Degree Felony-Murder

First degree murder has been upheld under the felony-murder doctrine in
cases involving death by automobile, where the killing occurred in the commission
or furtherance of the predicate felony that is offered by the state in its first degree
murder statute."' Robbery is very often one of the enumerated felonies under the
purview of a state's first degree felony-murder statute." ' Therefore, in cases where
the defendant, in an attempt to flee the scene following a robbery, causes the death
of another with his vehicle, the felony-murder rule will support a first degree
murder conviction.' In Hall v. State," 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a first
degree murder conviction where the defendant in attempt to elude police following
a theft, hit and killed a pedestrian with his car. " 8 The Arkansas felony-murder
statute provides, that a person commits murder in the first degree where he causes
the death of another in the course of or in furtherance of any felony."' Therefore,
because the death was caused during the furtherance of the felony of theft, the
conviction was sustained."' These are demonstrations of how the felony-murder
doctrines have been applied where the vehicular homicide falls squarely within the
commission of an enumerated felony. However, turning a vehicular homicide, such
as that in Jones, into the felony of assault with a deadly weapon stretches the
predicate felony to consume more than its intended scope.
III

See id. at 126.
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620 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 1993).

113

See id. at 798.

114

See Lind, supra note 103, at 133.

115

A general survey of all states that have some version of the felony murder rule, demonstrates

robbery is nearly always included. See Section C, infra and notes.
118

See Whitman v. People, 420 P.2d 416, 418-19 (Colo. 1966) (holding that a defendant fleeing the

scene of a robbery in an attempt to avoid being caught and colliding with and killing another motorist was
justly prosecuted under the felony-murder rule).
117

772 S.W.2d 317 (Ark. 1993).

Ila

See id. at 320-21.

119

See ARK. CODE ANN. §5-10-102(a)(1) (Michie 1991).

120

See Hall, 772 S.W.2d at 319.
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C.

Survey of State EnumeratedFelonies

In order to explore the possibility of this misuse' of the felony-murder
rule in similar circumstances nationwide it is necessary to examine the felonymurder statutes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Fortunately, an
examination of the enumerated felonies offered by the state legislatures will
demonstrate that the likelihood of abuse outside of several isolated states is limited.
Of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, forty-nine have some
version of the felony-murder rule.' Of those remaining jurisdictions, only seven
have statutes that are conducive to utilizing the felony-murder rule in cases of
vehicular homicide.'24 As discussed earlier, North Carolina has as one of its
enumerated felonies any "other felony committed or attempted with the use of a
deadly weapon[.]"" This "any other felony" wording provides a narrow opening
for the state to slide vehicular homicide into the purview of a plain reading of the
statute. Similarly, the statutes of Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, New Mexico, and
Texas each provide that the death caused during or in the furtherance of "any
felony" may be used to support a conviction for first degree murder utilizing their
respective felony-murder statute. 2 The result is that a vehicular homicide that
occurs during an episode of drunk driving can be prosecuted under the felonymurder rule as a killing that occurred in the commission of "any felony."' 27
Another example of the possible ramifications is a vehicular homicide that injures
one passenger but kills another where no alcohol is involved. The defendant is open
to a "battery causing serious injury" charge on the injured person as the predicate
See supra text accompanying notes 19-52. The author's opinion of the use of the felony-murder
rule under these circumstances is that it is an abuse of legislative intent.
121

122
The criminal statutes of Hawaii, Missouri, and Wisconsin do not contain a felony-murder
provision. HAw. REV. STAT. § 707-701 (1998); Mo. REv STAT. § 565.020 (1997); Wis. STAT. § 940.01
(1997).
123

The criminal statutes of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, New Mexico, North Carolina,

and Texas, have a provision under the felony-murder statute that may allow flexibility for the state to utilize
the felony-murder rule in cases of accidental vehicular homicide. ALA. CODE- §13A-6-2(a)(3) (1998); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(l) (1997); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (a)(2) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5l(c) (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-2-1(A)(2) (1998); N.C. GEN.STAT. § 14-17 (1994); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. §19.02(b)(3) (1997).
124

See supra text accompanying notes 53-79.

125

See supra note 54.

The criminal statutes of Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, New Mexico and Texas, provide that a death
during the furtherance of "any felony" may be used as the basis for a first degree murder conviction. See
supranote 123.
128

127

This result can only occur when driving under the influence is a felony.
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felony for the murder of the individual who is killed.'28
The good news is that forty-three states and the District of Columbia have
not drafted first degree murder statutes that would allow for such convictions.'29
The bad news, of course, is that seven states are free to submit to an arguably
sympathetic jury that the defendant deserves a sentence under first degree murder,
regardless of his intent. 3 The news gets worse for those same defendants because
these same seven states allow for the penalty of death for the offense of first degree
murder. 3' Therefore, the possibility of utilizing the felony-murder rule in cases of
vehicular homicide is arguably available beyond North Carolina.
VI. CONCLUSION
The practice of placing limits on the felony-murder doctrine is not only the
modem trend but has been the norm since the felony-murder rule's inception in
England.' However, the opposite end of the legal scale is weighted by a
tremendous public outcry to administer severe punishments on wrongdoers."
There is no area of criminal law where this is more evident than in cases of drunk
driving. Proponents of no mercy sentences for drunk drivers are well organized and
therefore are to be reckoned with politically." Prosecutors subject to this political
pressure are encouraged to find novel ways to get those stiff sentences, even if it
means circumventing the penalties already enacted by the state legislatures for
particular crimes. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of State v. Jones.
As discussed earlier, the dominant purpose of the felony-murder doctrine
is deterrence in committing violent felonies or in committing felonies in a violent
way.' Driving while intoxicated is unarguably a social evil requiring a punishment
128

See discussion infra.

129

See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.

130

See supra note 123.

131

Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Texas, allow for the

possibility of the death penalty under convictions for first degree murder, subject to the requirements of
aggravating circumstances. See supra note 123.
,32

See supra text accompanying notes 19-52.

Advocates supporting severe punishments for DUI related crimes are well-organized and are a
strong political force. See Steven Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment
Protections, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 163 (1984); Lance Rogers, The Drunk-DrivingRoadblock: Random
Seizure or Minimal Intrusion?,21 CRIM. L. BULL. 197, at 202.
133

134

See id.

135

See supra text accompanying notes 38-40
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severe enough to act as a deterrent. The harm of this act multiplies exponentially
when the death of another human being occurs as a result. However, to allow the
punishment of a drunk driver who kills accidentally to rise to the level of a rapist or
a premeditated murderer is not at all consistent with this nation's ideals of equating
the punishment with culpability.
Greg Bailey*
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